Water Law Review
Volume 3

Issue 2

Article 45

1-1-2000

United States v. City of Challis, 988 P.2d 1199 (Idaho 1999)
Steven Marlin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Steven Marlin, Court Report, United States v. City of Challis, 988 P.2d 1199 (Idaho 1999), 3 U. Denv. Water
L. Rev. 463 (2000).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

due process when it was so vague that those of common intelligence must
guess at the meaning and differ in its application. The Act defined
"structure," in part, as something constructed or built that was "capable of
being used as a place of habitation ... not being used [or] not capable of
being used as a means of transportation." The court declined to find the
term "structure" as unconstitutionally vague merely because it failed, as
Rouse argued, to define "means of transportation." In addressing the term
"tidewaters," the court determined that the statute "plainly" indicated all
public waters within the territory of the State of Georgia.
Rouse also contended the Act violated equal protection because it
granted exceptions to commercial establishments. The court first noted
that the Act did not affect a fundamental right of Rouse. As such, there
needed only be a "reasonable relationship" between the legislative
classification and the state purpose.
The court determined it was
reasonable for the legislature to exempt certain commercial establishments
from the Act because those establishments benefited the public's use of the
tidewaters of the State.
Rouse's final contention alleged the Act equated a taking of his
property. The court stated that Rouse did not have any entitlement to
maintain his property in the tidewaters since he did not have permits to be
there before the passage of the Act. Further, Rouse did not fall into any
exception within the Act, and therefore was entitled to no protection from
the enforcement of the Act.
Kim Shropshire
IDAHO
United States v. City of Challis, 988 P.2d 1199 (Idaho 1999) (holding
that the Multi-Use Sustained-Yield Act did not provide the basis for federal
reserved rights for national forests).
The United States ("U.S.") brought an action for general adjudication
of water rights concerning thirty-seven water right claims located in
Idaho's Snake River basin. The U.S. originally filed these water right
claims under the Multi-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 ("MUSYA") in
1993, claiming a priority date of June 12, 1960 (the date of MUSYA's
enactment) under MUSYA and Idaho water appropriation law. The U.S.
claimed that the MUSYA provided the basis for non-consumptive instream
flows to allow for water to remain in streams and lakes for the purpose of
protecting recreational values, fish, and wildlife. Such water rights could
potentially curtail upstream water rights, but would allow downstream
users to divert water.
The State of Idaho ("State") filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that MUSYA did not establish a basis for implied federal reserved
water rights. The U.S. also filed a motion for summary judgment asserting
that no material facts were in dispute as to legitimate federal reserved
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water rights for the purposes specified under MUSYA. Following a
hearing, the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") District Court held
as a matter of law that MUSYA did not provide implied federal reserved
water rights. Specifically, the court held that MUSYA did not create a
reservation of land and that, absent a reservation for specific MUSYA
purposes, the MUSYA purposes were secondary and could not support an
implied reservation of water. The court also held that certification under
state procedural law was proper for the federal reserved water right claims
under MUSYA, and that these claims were fully severable from the state
law-based claims and therefore constituted final judgment.
The U.S. filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's
ruling granting certification and the district court denied this motion. The
U.S. appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed both the district court's certification of the U.S.'s MUSYA claim,
and the district court's holding that MUSYA did not provide a basis for
federal reserved water rights.
The court first addressed the certification issue, and held that the fact
that the district court certified a judgment as final and appealable under
state law did not restrict the court's right to review the matter. The court
noted that in order for a partial summary judgment to be certified as final
and appealable under state law, the order granting partial summary
judgment must finally remove one or more of the claims between the
parties. Otherwise, the certification was in error. The court determined
that because the U.S. withdrew the state law portion of nine of the water
claims, those claims on appeal were asserted only under federal law and
were not supported under a state law basis. Accordingly, the court held
that the U.S.'s argument against certification no longer existed, and the
court had the ability to address whether MUSYA provided a basis for
implied federal water rights.
The court next addressed whether MUSYA provided a basis for
implied federal reserved water rights. The court summarized the rule
pertaining to federal reserved water rights as fashioned in a series of
United States Supreme Court cases: a federal reserved water right arises by
implication when the federal government reserves public land for a
particular governmental purpose, such as the creation of parks, wildlife
refuges, and national forests. The reserved water right must be based on a
reservation of land, and the U.S. acquires a right to unappropriated
appurtenant water to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the
land reservation.
The U.S.'s water rights vest on the date of the
reservation and the water right is superior to the right of future
appropriators.
The court held that the necessity of the water must be so great that
without the water the reservation would be entirely defeated. However, if
water were only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, the U.S.
was required to acquire water in the same manner as any other public or
private appropriators. Applying these principles, the court reasoned that a
federal reserved water right arose under MUSYA if, first, a reservation of
land occurred pursuant to MUSYA, and second, Congress showed an
expressed or implied intent to reserve unappropriated water for the
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purposes of MUSYA.
The U.S. argued that MUSYA re-reserved the national forests as of
June 12, 1960, when Congress enacted MUSYA, for the purpose expressed
Therefore, federal reserved water rights necessary to
in MUSYA.
accomplish the purpose of this reservation dated back to June 12, 1960.
However, the State claimed that MUSYA did not create a new land
reservation, but merely established additional purposes for the management
of national forests. Therefore, the State argued, MUSYA was a land
management statute, not a reservation of land. Furthermore, MUSYA did
not enlarge reserved water rights for the national forests, which Congress
created pursuant to the Organic Administration Act of 1897 ("Organic
Act").
The court ruled, based on its own analysis of the statutory language,
legislative history, and Supreme Court case law, that under MUSYA,
Congress intended only to broaden the purposes for administering the
national forests already reserved under the Organic Act. The court
emphasized that the language in MUSYA specifically made the purposes of
the statute supplemental to, and not in derogation of, the purposes for
which the national forests were created under the Organic Act. Therefore,
no specific federal land reservation occurred under MUSYA.
The court further noted, based on the MUSYA provisions and
legislative history, that MUSYA did not indicate an express or implied
congressional intent to reserve a federal water right. Therefore, because
MUSYA merely supplemented the Organic Act, any water use required for
the purposes of MUSYA were secondary, and thus, the U.S. had to
acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private
appropriator. The court concluded that since MUSYA made no land
reservation, and did not create a federal reserved water right, the U.S.
could not claim a water right with a priority dating back to June 12, 1960.
Steven Marlin
LOUISIANA
Bransford v. International Paper Timberlands Operating Co., 750 So.
2d 424 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an owner of a servient estate had
no affirmative duty to remedy naturally occurring conditions on the
servient land).
Camille S. Bransford and International Paper Timberlands Operating
Company ("International Paper") owned adjacent tracts of land in Webster
Parish, Louisiana. Due to the proximity of the lands, surface water from
Bransford's land naturally drains across International Paper's land. In late
1995, Bransford's son, who had power of attorney to manage the land,
began removing beavers and beaver dams from the property due to
flooding caused by the obstructions. In late summer 1996, Bransford's son
determined that a beaver dam located on International Paper's property

